This paper explores theories radicalization by analysing the twenty-one individuals convicted to-date under Australian anti-terrorism laws. All twenty-one are Australian citizens and so are discussed with reference to literature on home-grown terrorists.
terrorist networks, with within-network similarities in terms of age and country of family origin. These social bonds were also found to extend beyond friendship to kinship, with more than one family member becoming involved in the same terrorist network. Indeed, Bakker (2006) concluded that, while it may differ across networks, kinship seems to be more important than friendship in European networks, while Sageman (2004) found friendship bonds to be more important for his sample.
Whilst Innes outlines, indoctrination as a catalyst, Silber and Bhatt outline indoctrination as a third stage of the radicalization process. It is at this third stage of indoctrination that the individual accepts and internalises the extremist ideas. As Azzam (2007) explains, due to certain (pre-radicalisation) factors, a minority of Muslims may feel angry towards their home country, marginalised and/or disadvantaged, and may have a tendency towards violence and crime. Further, Western policies may be viewed as anti-Muslim and are taken personally. Having moved towards orthodox Islam, the package offered by the extremist perspective is attractive: it serves as a legitimate expression of these feelings and encourages (and condones) violent action.
Innes et al. remarks on the ability of violent extremists to justify or legitimise violence and draws on Sykes and Matza's (1957) techniques of neutralization, specifically 'appealing to higher loyalties', viewing victims as 'deserving of their fate', and 'condemning the condemners'. Silber and Bhatt (2007) propose that the justification for the extremist perspective is often provided by a 'spiritual sanctioner' who provides radical interpretations of the Qur'an (Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, 2006) and may be intensified by a withdrawal from the Mosque to more clandestine meetings of like-minded individuals. Silber and Bhatt's (2007) final stage of radicalisation is termed Jihadization and involves acceptance of the violent jihad mission. At this stage, the group of people mixing together at stage three may begin referring to themselves as 'mujahideen' and engage in group bonding exercises, some of which may provide pseudo-military training (e.g. paintballing) or may involve travel abroad to actual terrorist training camps (Bakker, 2006) . This stage, therefore, involves preparation for action, which may lead to planning an actual attack (target selection, procurement of materials, etc.).
Aims
This paper is a step towards describing and explaining the Australian context and with the recent convictions and sentencing and the release of new open source data through the law reports (i.e., R v. xxx), it is timely and of relevance to radicalization and de-radicalization in Australia. Clearly there are overlaps between models that have been proposed to explain engagement in violent extremism and indeed there does not have to be a unitary path into violent extremism (Davis & Cragin, 2009 ). Innes, et al., (2007 suggest that both their own model and that of Silber and Bhatt (2007) 
Data collection
The cases were identified from the Attorney General's website (http://www.ag.gov.au/www/agd/agd.nsf/Page/Nationalsecurity_Counter-terrorismandrelatedcases). Information on each case was then collected through the relevant Law reports supplemented with newspaper articles concerning the cases.
Roche, Lodhi and Khazaal were each tried in separate cases. Benbrika and his Melbourne group were tried together as part of the same case as were the Sydney group. As shown in Table 1 , at least one Law report was available for each case, with 10 available for the Sydney group and 37 available for the Benbrika and Others case.
Operation Pendennis also attracted a large amount of media attention and 89 newspaper reports of Benbrika and others case and 26 for the Sydney group were analysed. In total, 169 newspaper reports and 71 law reports were collected as the data for this paper.
[Insert Table 1 here] While it is recognised that newspaper reports may provide a selective presentation of case material, they are produced from a variety of sources of information. Further, a number of different newspaper publications were drawn upon to help balance the perspective of individual reporters. The addition of the Law reports themselves enables access to the facts as accepted by the court, thus increasing the reliability of the information. Newspaper accounts and law reports have been used effectively in research on other topics and discussions of the data can be found in Porter (2008) . More discussion of data?
Data coding
The Law and media reports were analysed for descriptive features of the individuals (e.g., characteristics and background) and also their actions and associations that led to their convictions. From here, specific features were organised around the themes relevant to the radicalisation literature. Features were coded as present/absent for each case and, where possible, quotes from the individuals were collected to illustrate the presence of particular attitudes and justifications. Quotes were available from a variety of sources such as letters, interviews and, in the case of Operation Pendennis, extracts presented from the conversations recorded by covert surveillance. The nature of the dataset means that there is inevitably the potential for missing factors that are not reported and this must be bourne in mind in interpreting the results. While it is acknowledged that the use of open-source data is limited in terms of the richness and personal nature of the material available, the current study did use multiple sources and drew, where possible, on quotes from the individuals themselves.
Results
The following provides a descriptive analysis of the characteristics, behaviour and background experiences of the 21 individuals with respect to themes of Background situation and characteristics (age, family background, attachments and criminal record); Identity changes (religious conversion and brotherhood identity); Ideology and attitudes (recruitment and attitudes), and; Capability and active participation (group structure, literature and capability).
Background situation and characteristics
This section outlines characteristics and background of the sample members including their age, family background, attachments and criminal record. Such characteristics and experiences may have made them vulnerable to radicalisation.
Age and gender. The ages of the 21 convicted terrorists range from 20 years to 47 years old at the time of their involvement in the events that led to their conviction.
The mean age of the 21 is 29 years (SD = 7.6 years), although two thirds of the sample were under the age of 30, three were in their 30's and three aged 40 or over.
All were male.
[Insert Table 2 here]
Family background. While all of the twenty-one are Australian citizens, only nine were born in Australia: seven to Lebanese immigrant parents, one to Australian parents and one to an Australian mother and Indonesian father. The country of birth was unavailable in the data for three of the men. Four were born in Lebanon, and the remaining in Pakistan, Algeria, former Yugoslavia, Bangladesh and the UK. Those born overseas moved to Australia either as a very young child with their parents (n=3) or in their twenties (n=4). Thus, only four are known to have grown up outside Australia. These four had still been in Australia for between five and 22 years when they actually engaged in the terrorist related behaviour for which they were convicted.
Lodhi had been in Australia five years, Mulahalilovic for 9 years, Benbrika for 16 years and Roche for 22 years.
While there was no information to suggest that Jack Roche had siblings, the majority of the sample had large numbers of siblings. The remaining ten men had between two and nine siblings with a mean of six siblings (SD ± 2).
Whilst the majority of the sample had no reported significant childhood experiences, two had divorced or separated parents, a further two experienced the death of their Mother as a child -Aimen Joud at age two and Jack Roche at age 13 -although Joud's father remarried. One had experienced significant problems at school, reportedly due to psychiatric problems, which led to his expulsion, and two experienced violence from their father.
Attachments. Fifteen of the 21 men had family relatives (siblings, parents, uncles/aunts or cousins) living in Australia (for 4 men this was unknown from the data). Sixteen were also married at the time of their involvement in terrorist activity (3 unknown), although one was described as having been unfaithful to his wife and one marriage was arranged. Of those who were married, twelve had children (between 1 and 7 children; mean 3; SD±2) and three had wives pregnant with their first child at the time of their arrest. None who had children were unmarried.
Information on the education level reached was only available for 13 of the 21 sample members. Of those 13, eight dropped out of school, three completed high school and two completed University level qualifications (one at undergraduate and one at postgraduate level).
In terms of employment, one (Lodhi) was an architect, having qualified in Pakistan and then worked to qualify in Australia, and one worked for a recruitment firm. Nine worked in vocational or manual jobs, including as an electrician (n=2), factory and/or building site work (n=4) or other tradesman (n=3). Three ran their own trades business while one developed a business selling various products on-line. One relied on Fraud for income, including both fraudulent use of credit cards and fraudulently claiming benefits, and two were unemployed.
Lack of attachments.
Five of the men were currently receiving, or had at some time received, welfare payments/ benefits. While this was claimed fraudulently in the case of Izzydeen Attik, three were for unemployment, two of which were for leaving work due to poor health or injury, while the third also reported health problems. One further man, Khaled Sharrouf was also drawing disability support pension. This means that they did not have the attachments that participation in the workforce brings.
In addition to experiencing physical health problems, the same five men also reported psychological disorders, some of which were confirmed by court appointed psychologists during their trial, although not all were accepted as completely truthful by the Judge (particularly in the case of Izzydeen Attik). Reported disorders covered adjustment disorder, anxiety, depression, paranoia, schizophrenia and low IQ.
In the case of Khazaal, these physical and psychological problems resulted in his reporting to be housebound and essentially isolated. Benbrika, too, showed increasing isolation, first in terms of isolation from people outside of his Muslim community, and later mainly associating with those who supported radical interpretations of Islam. Indeed, Benbrika is reportedly a self-taught Muslim cleric, choosing to study religion on his own rather than attending classes. Benbrika and his group showed later isolation within the Muslim community, breaking away from the local mosque. A further sign of a lack of attachment to the wider community can also Criminal record. Six of the men had a previous criminal record, one having been in prison. Offences on record were for dishonesty (n=2), theft (n=2), violence (n=2), firearms (n=1) and driving (n=2) offences. Seven men also reported addiction issues (including alcohol, drugs and gambling).
Identity changes
While some of the factors described above may create a vulnerability for involvement in terrorism many Australians share these characterstics and have no interest in involving themselves in terrorist activities. Involvement in terrorism requires more active or decisive behaviour. This section outlines more active factors regarding religious conversion and brotherhood identity.
Conversion or renewed interest in religion.
While some of the men were raised in Muslim countries or attended an Islamic school in Australia, a prominent theme for ten of the 21 was converting to (n=3), or renewing their interest in (n=7) the Muslim faith prior to their involvement in terrorist activity. For two, this was triggered by a positive experience. Lodhi claimed that after his marriage, he felt a strong need to have a greater structure and focus in his life and it has been in this context that he has become more dedicated to the spiritual aspects of his life (R v Lodhi, 2006, p.10 ).
For Benbrika, "he perceived the observance of Islam to be becoming more difficult in his home country (of Algeria)" (R v Benbrika and Ors., 2009, p.5) . His arrival in Australia meant that he felt more freedom to actively engage in religious activities and become an Islamic scholar.
For another eight men, negative events were the trigger, such as the death of a close family member (n=2), drug/alcohol addiction (n=4) and a combination of divorce and alcoholism (n=1). Finally, for one man, a combination of psychological symptoms, and exposure through a visit to a Muslim country and moving in with a religious relative, combined to encourage that individual to follow his Muslim faith with more vigour.
Brotherhood & group identity. For many, an attraction to terrorist involvement is through the collective identity that it represents or provides, through real or imagined connections/relationships. This collective might be a tangible, present group that provides real connections, such as the Benbrika group and Sydney cell, where not only were members meeting and participating in activities together regularly but ties between some group members extended to kinship. The Benbrika group included two brothers, as well as their school friend. The Sydney cell contained an uncle and nephew.
Benbrika increased the sense of the collective identity of the group through his speech by using inclusive first person pronouns (we, us, our) rather than second or third person pronouns (you, them) and on occasion his speech shows conscious choice through correction in the language he uses. For example, correcting "you" to "we":
"If you kill -we kill -here 1000, the Government is going to think" 1 ,
And correcting "them" to "us": "This is but a short document I hastily prepared in response to a request from brothers working to support this religion. I was requested to prepare it, in this fashion, to serve as a reference to all brothers or small cells desiring to support this religion. 4 Similarly, the sense of identity is increased through the belief that the brotherhood in-group is being mistreated by, or is at war with, the out-group (which could be perceived as Westerners, non-Muslims, or anyone -including Muslims -that does not support their extreme view of Islam). Thus, this identity is seen as a positive united front, protecting its members from external attack. Two of the sample members showed evidence of the belief that they were acting to defend their community. For Centre of Australia (IISCA). However, others may not have direct experience but are exposed indirectly through the radical ideas of others.
Ideology and attitudes
This section outlines how the sample were recruited or exposed to radical ideas and illustrates some of the radical ideas and attitudes that were held in support of terrorism.
Recruitment/ exposure to radical ideas. Recruitment to terrorist groups is often through exposure to particular radical or extremist religious views through speeches or association with particular individuals or current members of groups. Capability and active participation
The theme described here involves acts in preparation and furtherance of terrorist acts. The quotes given above demonstrate justification for violent jihad. This section will now focus on some of the behaviour that would indicate a furtherance of this mission. These include a formalised presence of the group (or individuals as part of a group) evident in certain group structural properties; use of literature and the internet, and; increasing capability (e.g. through training).
Structure and communication.
One aspect of structure that is evident among the sample is the taking on of roles. For example, Roche, when recruited was given specific tasks to complete for the group -surveilling potential targets in Australia and recruiting other Australians -as well as acting as an interpreter for other JI members at times.
Benbrika's group was argued at trial to be organised and structured (although it was not accepted that the Crown proved any formal structure). Several members Further security, or anti-surveillance, tactics were described in court, including individual members being told details of the group's activities and plans on a "need to The Sydney cell members, however, were considered to be in a slightly more advanced stage of planning and had accessed large amount of weapons and ammunition as well as materials that were believed to be associated with bombmaking attempts. However, these attempts were described "limited", "amateurish"
and "ineffective" (R v Touma, 2008 ) and activities to acquire materials were far from expert. For example, Sharrouf was caught shoplifting a large number quantity of batteries and several clocks. Nonetheless, as judge Bongiorno states, lack of expertise does not necessarily pose any less of a threat, overseas experience of terrorist activity with which we are all unfortunately now very familiar does not suggest that terrorism is the preserve of highly skilled or highly effective operatives. Indeed, it might be said that terrorist acts as they have been experienced in modern times are often carried out by amateurs whose principal attribute has not been skill but rather a zealous or fanatical belief in some ideology or other which seeks to promote itself by the use of violence (R v Benbrika, 2009, p.21 ).
In the cases of Jack Roche and Shane Kent, however, evidence was provided for a degree of de-radicalization, or loss of commitment to terrorist activity. Showing that movement through the stages is not uni-directional, or unstoppable. Roche is reported to have left JI after disagreements with members and made several attempts to contact Australian authorities, including the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO). Indeed, the court accepted that Roche had remained inactive in the community for two years prior to his arrest and incarceration and that "there was no prospect that the offender would be involved in anything of this kind again" (R v 
Discussion
The sample used in the present study were all convicted under Australian law.
There is much contention around anti-terrorism law and whether such laws are 'over- and unmarried. Indeed, this profile is similar to that which supported social control/bond theories of criminality (Reckless, 1961; Hirschi, 1969) . In contrast, the current sample members are somewhat older than this profile, with a mean age in their late 20's. There is, though, a marked difference between the ages of those members who were followers of Benbrika (all under age 27 years old) and the remaining sample (all over 30 years old).
Further, whilst there were differences among the current sample members in terms of education and employment, the majority of the sample had family in Australia, were married, many had children and most had some form of employment.
Indeed, unlike Camins' (2003) Palestinian terrorists, the sample show a great deal of evidence of attachments to society rather than detachment from it. However, isolation increased as radicalisation progressed and intensified. Thus, isolation does appear to have facilitated radicalisation in the Australian sample.
There may, however, be an important difference between attachments to community and attachments to society. While the individuals may show family and community attachments, they were not necessarily integrated into wider Australian The triggering events experienced by the present sample were not all necessarily negative, though, as Silber & Bhatt (2007) and Innes, et al. (2007) seem to suggest when discussing triggers, or signal events, respectively. For example, Lodhi's marriage is said to have caused him to feel the need to be better focused and more structured, leading him to pursue religion more purposefully than he had previously. There is strong evidence for the use of neutralizations (Sykes & Matza, 1957) , With regard to the specific models of radicalisation of Innes, et al. (2007) and Silber and Bhatt (2007) , the present sample shows similarities to, and therefore evidence for, many of the inherent concepts. Xxx implicationsxxx For example, themes relating to all four of Silber and Bhatt's stages were identified, although the data did not allow for the stage process to be tested explicitly as the sequential ordering of circumstances for the sample individuals could not always be demonstrated. The sample did seem to follow a general trend of increasing indoctrination into the extremist ideology and isolation from community and western influences. However, some of the cell members involved in Operation Pendennis (both Melbourne and Sydney) were still asking for ideological clarification relating to explanations of legitimisation of terrorist attacks and martyrdom while they were also involved in behaviour that could be said to be increasing capability. Thus, they were displaying jihadization (stage four) behaviour while perhaps not fully indoctrinated (stage three). The majority of Innes, et al.'s (2007) model concepts were present in the sample, although some (such as ideology, indoctrination and group dynamics) were more prominent than others. For example, while some evidence of inter-and intracommunity separation was evident, such as Muslim/Australian identity issues and increased isolation, there was little evidence of beliefs of declining social control.
Moreover, it is important to mention that Roche's severance from JI and cessation of terrorist-related activity indicates possibilities of de-radicalisation.
Roche's case suggests that not only can the process be halted but it can be reversed.
That is, Roche was committed to carrying out terrorist activities but then ceased this activity. While Silber and Bhatt (2007) Pickering, et al. (2008) suggest that, to build community trust in the police, community engagement must operate under a philosophy of two-way information sharing, such that communities ultimately receive knowledge regarding, or can influence how, such information passed to police is used. This may prove difficult in counter-terrorism as too much transparency in these processes can lead to effective counter measures.
Conclusion
The present paper has provided a picture of 21 individuals currently convicted under Australian anti-terrorism law. As such is offers a first step towards the systematic documentation of violent extremism in Australia. In turn, defining and explaining why people become violent extremists in the Australian context is the first step in developing strategies that encourage more positive engagement with people susceptible to an extremist agenda. 
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